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ABSTRACT

Strangers come into a child's room in the middle of the night, drag her kicking and screaming into a van, apply handcuffs, and drive her to a behaviormodification facility at a distant location. What sounds like a clear-cut case of
kidnapping is complicated by the fact that the child's parents not only authorized
this intervention, but also paidfor it. This scarcely publicizedpractice-known as
the youth-transportationindustry-operateson the fringes of existing law. The law
generally pre-sumes that parents have almost unlimited authority over their
children, but the youth-transportationindustry has never been closely examined
regarding exactly what the transportationprocess entails or whether it is in fact
legal.
The companies provide a service to parents who want to send their children to
behavior-modificationfacilities, including boot camps and other residential reform schools, but who are unable or unwilling to deliver the children themselves. A
transportation company contracts with the parents to arrangefor pickup and
conveyance; the parents delegate rights over their children to the company,
usually by signing a power of attorney. Due to the circumstances in which these
transports typically take place, however, this delegation of rights has far greater
implications than simply authorizingthe transportationof a childfrom point A to
point B. After suffering the emotional trauma of being taken from their parents,
children may suffer physical abuse as well, as the companies often use force in
the form of handcuffs and other restraints. This Article examines the details of
the transportprocess and raises legal questions about the disciplinary authority
that parentspossess, including the extent to which they can grant this authorityto
a third party.
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Similar questions arose in the past with analogous private-transportation
entities, but those questions were addressed when Congress issued strict regulations to monitor and limit their ability to transport vulnerable individuals. This
Article provides the first in-depth examination of the legal issues relevant to the
youth-transportationindustry and recommends regulationsthat should be promulgated to keep the delegation ofparentalauthority in check and thusprotect the best
interests of the child.
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INTRODUCTION

It was a quiet fall morning, just like any another.1 Everyone was asleep, except
Julie's parents, who were anxiously awaiting the call.2 Julie had been experiencing
difficulties at school and at home-the fighting over her recent behavior and

1. The following narrative is a fictional composite of several individual accounts of youths' experiences during
transport by private transportation companies.
2. See Nadya Labi, The Bogeyman, LEGALAF., July-Aug. 2004, at 28, available at http://Iegalaffairs.orglissues/
July-August-2004/feature_1abi-julaugO4.msp (reporting on an example of the transport process).
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disappointing academic performance had reached a boiling point.3 Desperate and
confused, Julie's parents had researched online residential reform schools that
focused on adolescent behavior modification. Her parents had discovered a facility
that seemed promising and enrolled Julie at once. Because Julie had been acting
out, her parents feared that she would refuse to attend the new school and possibly
run away.4 After expressing these concerns to the facility, Julie's parents received
contact information for a company that transports youths to the facility and similar
programs. 5
Julie's parents contacted the transportation company and received the necessary
paperwork. They signed one form delegating parental rights over Julie to the transporters and another form that absolved the company from liability in case of an
accident.6 They also received information concerning how the process would be
carried out; this information explained that the most efficient and peaceful way to
transport Julie was for the transporters to wake her up early in the morning and to
remove her from the house as quickly as possible. The company recommended
that Julie's parents not be involved in this process 8 and assured them that no
physical restraints would be used unless absolutely necessary. 9 In addition, the
company promised to treat Julie respectfully'o and to keep her safe throughout
the trip.

3. See id. (describing the troubles a tenth-grade boy was facing that led to his transport to a private
behavior-modification facility).
4. See Michelle Ray Ortiz, 'Escort Service' or Legalized Abduction?, L.A. TIMEs, June 13, 1999, http://
articles.latimes.com/1999/jun/13/locallme-46067 (explaining that these transport services are often a "last-resort"
for parents because they do not think their child will go to a program willingly).
5. See Tom Kellner, Too-Tough Love?, FORBES, Mar. 1999, at 112, availableat http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
1999/0322/6306112a.html (describing various teen reform facilities).
6. See, e.g., Search and Rescue Application, CHRISTIAN FAMILY NETWORK, http://www.teentransport.org/files/
srapplication_072209344pm.doc.pdf (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) (providing an indemnification contract and a
special power of attorney for temporary child custody).
7. See Jack Swint, Want Your Troubled Kid to Disappearin the Middle of the Night, W. VA. NEWS (June 16,
2011), http://westvirginianews.blogspot.com/201 1/01/want-your-troubled-kid-to-disappear-in.html (reporting that
agents choose nighttime to minimize the potential for disruptive behavior).
8. See Decca Aitkenhead, The Lost Resort (PartOne), THE GUARDIAN, June 28, 2003, http://www.theguardian.
com/education/2003/jun/29/schools.uki; Kellner, supra note 5. Although many accounts describe situations in
which the child is awakened by the transport agents, other accounts specify that the parents wake their child and
provide a brief explanation of what is happening before quickly leaving the room. See, e.g., Swint, supra note 7.
9. See Youth Transport-Questionsand Answers, USA GUIDES INC., http://www.youthtransport.us/?page=
2_13 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014) ("We will not utilize any restraints unless the Teen is in imminent danger of
injuring themselves or others. If the circumstances arise where restraints are used we will make every effort to
maintain the dignity of your child without sacrificing everyone's safety."). But see Swint, supra note 7 ("We found
some companies have a security policy of using handcuffs in every case regardless of their behavior. Children
have reported they were handcuffed and/or pepper sprayed just for crying.").
10. One company's policy provides:
Our Guides are trained to first use verbal skills & techniques to control a situation and are highly
effective at de-escalating a potential confrontation. As our Guides are in very close proximity to
the teen at all times they can 'read' the situation and if the Teen becomes combative we will
employ restraint holds that may be uncomfortable yet, will assure that no harm comes to either the

566

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:563

At five o'clock in the morning, the transporters called to let Julie's parents know
that they had arrived at the house." Julie's parents let the men inside and directed
them to Julie's room.' 2 The parents handed over a small bag of Julie's belongings
and remained out of sight.' 3 The transporters' 4 entered Julie's bedroom while she
was fast asleep.'" One man stood by the doorway while the other jolted Julie
awake and quickly informed her that she was going to a new school and that she
had to leave with them immediately.16 Confused, Julie asked if she could use
the restroom and change; the transporters refused and told her that everything she
needed was already packed in the car.'7 At this point Julie became extremely
frightened and demanded to see her parents, frantically searching to see if they
were in the room or the hallway. Sensing that Julie was agitated, the transporters
restrained her with handcuffs' 8 and physically forced her down the stairs' 9 and into
the secure vehicle.2 0
Julie was upset and asked where these men were taking her. She had no idea
where she was going. 2 ' After a few hours of driving, while at a gas station, Julie
asked to use the restroom. To her surprise, she was escorted in handcuffs to
the restroom, 2 2 which both she and the male transporter entered. Julie was released from the restraints, but remained supervised.23 Immediately after, Julie was

Teen or our Guides. The Teen will be handled with respect and they will be advised that the[y] will
have to go and it is their choice on how comfortable they would like to be during the transport.
Youth Transport-Questions and Answers, supra note 9.
I1. See Labi, supra note 2.
12. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, When Parents OK Abduction: Troubled Teenagers Snatched Away for Their
Own Good,' S.F. CHRON., June 22, 1994, at Al (describing one girl's experience when she was taken by a male
transporter).
13. See Swint, supra note 7 (describing a typical transport).
14. See Marianne Costantinou, Disciplinary Camps, Schools Put Teens' Rights on the Line, S.F. EXAMINER,
Jan. 18, 1998, at Al (noting that youth-transportation companies send "pretty good-sized guys" who travel in
pairs and that the companies "try to send people who are intimidating").
15. See id. (explaining that the transporters arrive at night so that the child will likely be asleep and thus caught
off-guard).
16. See, e.g., Holding, supra note 12.
17. See Labi, supra note 2 (recounting stories from a transporter who "has dragged teens to the car in their
underwear" and finding that transporters do not allow children to grab their clothes before being taken from their
homes).
18. See Costantinou, supra note 14 (interviewing a transporter who revealed that "[h]andcuffs are common in
the industry"); Labi, supra note 2 (describing the experiences of two youths who were handcuffed during the
transport process).
19. See, e.g., Holding, supra note 12 (quoting a youth describing his experience: "One guy knee-dropped in on
the middle of my back, bent back my wrist, leaned over into my ear and said, 'If you don't stop f-- - -ing
screaming, I'm going to bust your f-- - -ing wrist.' There was blood all over.").
20. See Costantinou, supra note 14 (stating that teens are often placed in a car with child locks to prevent
escape).
21. See Kellner, supra note 5.
22. Cf Swint, supra note 7 (asserting that children are also taken during the day from school and that in these
cases the children are put in handcuffs in front of their peers).
23. See id.
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restrained again and was escorted back to the vehicle in full sight of the patrons of
the gas station. Embarrassed and alone, Julie remained silent and cried in the back
of the car for the remaining hours of the drive.2 4
The public is largely unaware of how frequently youth transports, like the one
depicted in Julie's story, occur.2 5 This Article exposes the world of contracted,
purportedly legal, child kidnapping and argues that if these practices are permitted
to continue, appropriate regulations must be implemented to protect children's
safety and well-being. In addition, this Article highlights the fundamental inconsistencies between the youth-transportation industry and the laws protecting children's rights. First, Part I of this Article describes the problems inherent in the
transportation of youths by private transport companies and the laws that are
potentially implicated. Part I also details analogous industries that have been
forced to comply with regulations similar to those proposed in this Article. Next,
Part II demonstrates the parallels between established industries, such as juvenileoffender transport and private-prison transport, and the youth-transport industry.
Finally, Part III uses these parallels to formulate recommended regulations to
protect the rights of children during transport.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Youth-TransportationCompanies
The youth-transportation industry raises important questions about parental
authority, children's rights, and the tensions that exist between the two. These
companies are third-party entities that transport children to behavior-modification
facilities.2 6 Typically when "troubled" children and teens are taken to these
facilities in the United States and abroad, parents are unwilling or unable to
transport their children themselves.2 7 These companies exist to remove and deliver
the children efficiently and with minimal resistance.
Youth-transportation companies are in business throughout the United States as
well as internationally. 28 Although often established by former law-enforcement

24. See Costantinou,supra note 14 ("Most kids react with disbelief .... Some cry.").
25. See, e.g., Holding, supra note 12 (reporting that, among the hundreds of youth advocates, lawyers, police
officers, and educators interviewed for the story, few had ever heard of the industry).
26. These facilities are privately owned and privately run, the children have not been convicted of a crime, and
the facilities can maintain guardianship of the children until they turn eighteen. The children have restricted
access to communication with their parents and endure various behavior-modification practices, including labor
and workshops. See generally MAIA SZAIAVrZ, HELP AT ANY CosT. HOW THE TROUBLED-TEEN INDUSTRY CONS
PARENTS AND HuRTs Kins (2006).

27. This Article focuses on transportation companies that exist and practice in the United States. See Lenore
Behar et al., Protecting Youth Placed in Unlicensed, Unregulated Residential "Treatment" Facilities,45 FAM.
Cr. REV. 399, 404 (2007) (reporting results of a survey that stated that nearly fifty percent of children taken to
behavioral-modification facilities were transported by a youth-transportation company).
28. National and International Youth Transport: Troubled Teen, At-Risk, NEW START TRANSPORTS, http://
www.newstarttransports.com/intemational-transport.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
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and military personnel, many companies do not require any specific background or
training for their employees. 2 9 Despite this lack of training, parents delegate
authority to these companies through a power of attorney. Typically, parents meet
with the transport company's representative without the child's knowledge and
sign a contract that gives the transporter temporary custody of the child in order to
legally transport him or her to a facility, often across state lines. 3 0 These contracts
and the rights conferred are executed independently of the state, with no legal or
judicial oversight outside of traditional contract law.
Most transportation companies employ similar procedures when escorting
children. Contact with these companies begins with the parents' initial inquiries
and can result very quickly in a child's transport to a residential facility.3 2 The
transport typically occurs in the middle of the night to ensure that the child is at
home and asleep and therefore less likely to put up a fight.3 3 Other examples of
youth transport involve more brazen activity, such as taking the child from
school-often without disclosing the true intentions to school administrators.3 4
Parents complete and sign a power of attorney, legally delegating their parental
rights to the transporters and authorizing them to exercise almost unlimited control
over the child. The consequences of signing this power of attorney are drastic.
The power of attorney in these circumstances is presumptively valid because
parents have the ability to temporarily transfer their fundamental rights to any
third party. 36 State statutes allow parents to do this by contract, without the need

29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Search and Rescue Application,supra note 6.
31. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
32. See Swint, supra note 7 (explaining the transport process).
33. See id. (indicating that agents choose nighttime to minimize the potential for disruptive behavior).
34. See, e.g., W. Shield Investigations & Sec. Consultants v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 616
(Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the transporters came to the child's school while carrying handcuffs and firearms and
misrepresented themselves as detectives working for the county child-protective-services agency); Swint, supra
note 7 (recounting a case in which a child was removed from her school in handcuffs). The child described in West
Shield appears to be the same child described in many newspaper stories using a pseudonym. See Reynolds
Holding, Abducted DaughterTells Her Story, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 1994, at Al (reporting on the story of a girl
named "Lucy" who was taken from school by persons presenting themselves as child-protective-service workers
who carried handcuffs and firearms).
35. See West Shield, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 615 (quoting the contract as stating that the parents "have authorized
Agents of West Shield Investigations to exercise all control over Charleen [Eymil], that we, the parents can
exercise in the event that Charleen should need to be transported to Pathfinders, as we believe Charleen to be a
danger to herself or others"); Labi, supra note 2, at 29 (indicating that one contract authorized the transporters to
take "any act or action" on the parents' behalf during the transport); infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text
(detailing the process of delegating parental authority through a power of attorney). Few transport companies
make the contract available on their web sites, but those that do provide a chilling hint of what the process entails.
See, e.g., Search and Rescue Application, supranote 6, at 5 (authorizing transporters to "disciplin[e] according to
the Word of God").
36. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §26-2A-7 (LexisNexis 2009); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.020 (2010); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-5104 (2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-105 (2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-105 (2006); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 15-5-104 (2009); IND. CODE § 29-3-9-1 (West Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §5-104 (Supp.
2011); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-103 (West 2012); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. §700.5103 (West Supp.
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for a court's approval, and allow them to delegate all their parental powers except the right to consent to their child's adoption and marriage. This delegation
of parental powers provides the new guardian with substantial parental rights,
including the right to consent to otherwise tortious acts on behalf of the minor.
Despite the wide-sweeping powers that this right allows, there is very little
scholarly analysis of the subject.39
The exact rights that the parents confer can be ambiguous and difficult to apply
in the youth-transport context.4 0 Parents generally have the right to raise their
children as they see fit, with the primary condition that their conduct be lawful and
reasonable. 4 ' In the context of transferring parental rights to third parties, however,
it can be difficult to determine where the lines of lawful and reasonable conduct
should be drawn. 4 2 Courts have found that, when parents sign consent and powerof-attorney forms that delegate parental rights to third parties, those third parties
are absolved of liability for tort claims to a comparable extent as the parents
themselves would be.43
The transfer of parental authority, and its attendant tort immunity, is problematic when delegated to behavior-modification facilities. For example, in Blair v.
Wills,4 a sixteen-year-old student who attended one such facility brought several
state-law claims, including false-imprisonment and battery charges, alleging that
the school and its staff denied him reasonable bathroom privileges, forced him to
remain on school premises, assaulted him, and subjected him to sleep depriva-

2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-211 (West Supp. 2012); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 475.024 (West 2009); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-5-103 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2604 (2008); N.J. STAr. ANN. § 3B:12-39 (West 2007); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 45-5-104 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-26-04 (2010); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.056 (2011); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 62-5-104 (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-6-302 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-103 (LexisNexis 1993).

37. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-103(1) (2011) ("A parent or a guardian of a minor or incapacitated
person, by a properly executed power of attorney, may delegate to another person, for a period not exceeding 6
months, any powers regarding care, custody, or property of the minor child or ward, except the power to consent
to marriage or adoption of a minor ward.").
38. See Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 828-29 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that the presence of a power of attorney
properly executed pursuant to Missouri law precluded a student's claim of false imprisonment against a boarding
school because the school administrators were able to consent to the action on behalf of the child).
39. For example, the three volume treatise, LEGAL RiGHTs OF CHILDREN, devotes only six sentences to the
subject. I DONALD T. KRAMER, LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 6:18, at 567 (2d rev. ed. 2005).
40. See Reynolds Holding, Parents'Rights vs. Children's Rights, S.F. CHRON., June 24, 1994, at Al (stating
that a professor at Loyola Law School noted that parents' legal authority to delegate their rights originates in
academic and temporary child-care circumstances, which differ from the youth-transponation and behavioralmodification-facility situations).
41. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
42. See Holding, supra note 40 ("There's not a judge in the country who wants to define the line between the
constitutional rights of 14- or 17-year-old kids and the rights of parents to control them . . . .") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
43. See, e.g., Blair, 420 F.3d 823; Woods v. Wills, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Mo. 2005), aff'd per curiam,
225 F. App'x 420 (8th Cir. 2007).
44. 420 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2005).
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tion.4 5 Prior to his arrest, Blair's parents had signed a power of attorney delegating
parental authority to school administrators.4 6
On his false-imprisonment claim, the court noted that Blair was required to
show that he had been confined without his consent and without legal justification.47 The court further stated that the parents' consent on behalf of the minor is
relevant when determining whether the minor consented to confinement. 4 8 Blair
seemingly conceded that his parents had the right to consent on his behalf, arguing
only that his parents' consent was not informed. 49 The court granted summary
judgment for the defendants, holding that, because his parents consented to his
enrollment with full knowledge of the school's restrictions, the consent had been
informed and thus Blair could not maintain an action for false imprisonment.so
Similarly, in Woods v. Wills,5 ' five students brought claims of assault, battery,
and false imprisonment, among others, against employees of the same school that
Blair attended.s2 The parents of the five students had each executed a power of
attorney to the school before enrolling their children. Because the plaintiffs
understood that the powers of attorney immunized the school administrators from
liability for false imprisonment, they were forced to argue that their parents'
consent to enrollment at the school had been obtained by fraud.54
Parental delegation of authority to third parties is equally problematic in the
youth-transport context, as illustrated by the following news reports5 5 about
sixteen-year-old David van Blarigan from Oakland, California. David was taken
by private transporters in the middle of the night and was eventually sent to an
infamous therapeutic school in Jamaica.5 6 He traveled unaccompanied on the

45. Id. at 826.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 828.
48. Id. (citing Mo. Riv. STA. § 475.025 (2000)).
49. See id.
50. Id. at 828-29.
51. 400 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (E.D. Mo. 2005), aff'd per curium, 225 F.App'x 420 (8th Cir. 2007).
52. Id. at 1150.
53. Id. at 1153-57.
54. See id. at 1169-70 (observing that the false-imprisonment issue had already been decided in Blair and that
plaintiffs attempted to respond by arguing fraud). The court ultimately rejected the fraud claims because the
plaintiffs had not established all nine elements of Missouri's onerous test for fraud. Id. at 1185-86. On the alleged
abuses at some juvenile behavior-modification facilities, see Timothy Williams, Students Recall Special Schools
Run Like Jails, N.Y. TIMiis, July 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/07/24/us/students-recall-a-school-runlike-a-prison.htmi (describing the highly structured life and severe disciplinary measures, including being "held
on the floor for as long as an hour by staff members . . . pepper spraying, handcuffing, [and] being forced into
dog cages"). One former student reported being hogtied with duct tape and rope-for "passing gas without
permission." Id.
55. Litigation was involved in both of these cases, but the records are sealed due to the parties' status as
minors.
56. Jeff Stryker, Sorry to Wake You, Honey. They're Coming to Take You Away., N.Y. TIMiis, Feb. 1,
1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/01/weekinreview/word-for-word-teen-age-treatment-programs-sorrywake-you-honey-they-re-coming.htmi.
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plane, and when the school's representatives were late to pick him up, he called his
neighbor-an administrative law judge-to inform him of his situation.s7 The
neighbor brought the allegations to the attention of authorities; eventually a county
prosecutor filed a civil action against the parents seeking the child's return,
accusing them of aiding and abetting in the kidnapping and false imprisonment of
their son.58 The parents had signed a contract stating, "When it becomes necessary,
in the sole discretion of the Program, to restrain a Student, the Sponsors authorize
the Program to use pepper spray (or electrical disabler, mace, mechanical restraints, handcuffs)." 5 9 The prosecutor argued that the parents illegally delegated
their parental authority, but the judge ruled that the parents were acting within their
parental rightsi" The judge held that, without evidence of abuse, the parents'
decision could not be disturbed. 6 '
Despite the substantial authority that parents transfer to these companies, the
youth-transportation industry is almost completely unregulated.62 Most state laws
make no mention of this industry at all. Thus, there are no legal requirements
regarding personnel or procedures through which companies take, maintain, or
transfer custody of a child. Not surprisingly, there are many documented-and
who knows how many undocumented-examples of physical and emotional
injury occurring during these transactions. 63
While the industry lacks regulation, this is not for want of trying. Utah and
California have both addressed the issue in their state legislatures, but with varying
degrees of success. In 1991, the Utah legislature passed a law that would have
regulated youth-transport services by revoking any facility's license if it accepted
youths from transportation companies that were transporting children against their
will; it would have done so by classifying the practice as unlawful detention.M The
governor subsequently vetoed the bill because the only people who were prohibited from taking children against their will were those who had been hired
professionally, thus excluding those who had not been paid. 6 5
In 2000, California came closer than any other state to effectively addressing the

57. Adam Cohen et al., Is This a Camp or Jail?, TIME, Jan. 26, 1998, at 56-57.
58. See Henry K. Lee, Parents Had Right to Send Boy to Jamaica, Judge Rules /Reform School Was Their
Last Resort, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 21, 1998, http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Parents-Had-Right-to-Send-Boy-toJamaica-Judge-3016013.php.
59. See Andrew Leonard, Schools of Hard Knocks, SALON (Feb. 23, 1998), http://archive.is/8APDJ (quoting
from the contract); see also Lee, supra note 58 (relating the judge's concerns about these provisions).
60. Dan Reed, Banishing Son OK, Judge Says Parental Rights: 'Drastic' Move Shipping Troubled Boy to
Jamaica Legal, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 21, 1998, at IA (observing that legal experts described this ruling
as "consistent with decades of law that gives parents broad latitude in rearing their children as they see fit").
61. Judge Says Parents Had Right to Force Boy into Treatment, SArr LAKE TRIB., Jan. 21, 1998, at A3.
62. See National and International Youth Transport: Troubled Teen, At-Risk, supra note 28.
63. See infra Part II.B.
64. Cherrill Crosby, 181 Legislative Measures Still Await Governor's Decision, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 17,
1991, at B 1.
65. Cherrill Crosby, Bangerter Vetoes 9 Bills, Nixes 3 Appropriations, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 20, 1991, at Bl.
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issues that are implicated in the operation of these youth-transportation companies.
The legislature passed a law that actually defined "transport escort service,"6 6
articulated its purpose of protecting children, 7 and required transport companies
to register with the California child-care-provider registry, Trustline." While the
law made significant progress regarding the procedural aspects of youth transportation, it failed to adequately address the substance of the transportation-an
omission that left it open to a great deal of criticism.69
B. General Rights of Parents and Children
For more than a century, there has been a controversial dialogue in the United
States over how best to protect children's interests and the amount of weight that
should be given to children's fundamental rights, the rights of their parents, and the
interests of the state. Children's rights reform gained momentum with the Supreme
Court's 1966 decision in Kent v. United States,o in which the Court delineated
the role of juvenile courts and required due process protections for juveniles. 7 1
Then, in In re Gault,7 2 the Supreme Court in 1967 recognized children as people
deserving of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. While children were
still considered to have diminished constitutional rights due to their age, the Court
granted equal-protection rights to them, albeit with some limitations. 7 4 This
principle that children possess some constitutional rights was echoed in 1976,
when the Court asserted that children do not one day arbitrarily acquire rights, but
rather possess them all along.7 5
Despite numerous holdings that minors possess constitutional rights, 76 parents'

66. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1596.653 (West 2008) (defining a "transport escort service" as "any
person, partnership, association, or corporation that accepts financial compensation or other consideration to
accompany or transport minors ... to any residential facility or institution located outside the state").
67. See id. (providing that the California legislature's intent is "to protect the well-being of California
children").
68. Id.
69. See Karen Abbott, With Teens, Whose Rights Count Most?, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWs, Aug. 29, 1999, at 2A
(explaining that the law originally prohibited the use of handcuffs, straitjackets, and other restraints but was
watered down to require only that the transporters' criminal records had been checked).
70. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
71. Id. at562.
72. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
73. See id. at 30-31.
74. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,634(1979) (articulating reasons why children's constitutional rights are
more limited than adults, including their "peculiar vulnerability," their "inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner," and the important "parental role" in raising children); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,
403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (establishing that juveniles are not accorded all of the same rights as adult criminal
defendants, such as the right to a jury trial).
75. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (declaring unconstitutional a state
statute that required all unwed minors to obtain parental consent before receiving abortion services).
76. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (holding that children are entitled to due process notice
and a hearing when suspended from school); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(free-speech rights); Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-57 (right to notice of criminal charges, right to counsel, right to not
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rights over their children-including the right to delegate authority regarding their
children's freedom unilaterally and without review-have received great deference from the Supreme Court. For example, in 1923, in Meyer v. Nebraska," the
Court recognized that parents have the right to "establish a home and bring up
children."7 8 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,79 the Court reinforced
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct a child's upbringing and education."o
These two cases protect parental autonomy by finding a liberty interest in raising a
child as the parents see fit-a right that is protected by due process. 8 '
Parental authority over children is not unlimited, however; the state can curb
parental power to further the state's interest in protecting children from harm.82
Parens patriae is an archaic legal term that describes the state's ability to act
in loco parentis-in place of the parent-in order to protect children. The
Supreme Court has recognized a state's broad parens patriae power and
declared that a state "has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child's welfare."" The state may limit or sever a
parent's right to his or her child if it deems that the health or safety of the child is at
risk."
In the context of parents voluntarily committing their children to state-run
mental-health hospitals, for example, a neutral fact-finder must determine whether
committal is appropriate.8 ' The Court reached this conclusion in Parham v. J.R. by
applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, which is used to determine
whether state procedures that deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property
comport with procedural due process. The Court weighed (1) the child's interest
in not being committed, (2) the parent's interest in maintaining the health and
welfare of the child, (3) the state's interests in its procedures, and (4) the adequacy
of the current procedures in protecting against arbitrary confinements." After
balancing these factors, the Court concluded that the risk of error is sufficiently
great when parents decide to institutionalize their children for mental-health
incriminate oneself, right to cross-examine witnesses); Kent, 383 U.S. at 562-63 (due process rights in juvenile
court).
77. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
78. Id. at 399.
79. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
80. Id. at 534-35.
81. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 801 (4th ed. 2010).

82. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1944) (asserting that the state's police power allows
for broader regulation over children than adults).
83. 2 KRAMER, supra note 39, § 16:1, at 8-9 & n. 19.
84. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (1944) (upholding state child-welfare law).
85. 2 KRAMER, supra note 39, § 16:2, at 11.
86. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584,606-07 (1979) (declaring that the risk of error in letting the parent make
the decision unilaterally was sufficiently great to justify this imposition on parents' rights over their children).
87. See id. at 599-600 & n.Il (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)) (emphasizing that this
analysis applied because parents were committing their children to a state-run hospital).
88. See id.
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reasons that a neutral fact-finder must determine whether the statutory requirements for admission to the hospital are met.8
Another issue affecting the balance of rights between children and parents is the
parental-immunity doctrine. This doctrine, which was judicially created in Mississippi at the end of the nineteenth century in Hewellette v. George,90 originally
provided parents with blanket immunity from all negligent torts brought by their
children.91 The court cited no authority-neither from English common law nor
from any other tradition-for the doctrine's creation.9 2 Nevertheless, the doctrine
spread rapidly and was eventually adopted in most other states. 93 The underlying
rationales for the parental immunity doctrine include preservation of family
harmony,94 preservation of family assets, 9 5 and preservation of parental authority.9 6 Support for this doctrine waned, however, with early exceptions being carved
out for willful and malicious torts.97 Other common exceptions include negligent
child-rearing and parental abandonment, reckless and intentional acts, and negligent supervision." In fact, four states and the District of Columbia never adopted
the doctrine of parental immunity at all, and eleven states have abrogated it
completely.9 9

89. Id. at 606. The neutral fact-finder need not be a judicial officer, but he or she must make an in-depth
analysis of all the circumstances surrounding the child's situation before making a decision. Id. at 606-10. Since
the decision is largely medically based, medical professionals are in the best position to make the determination.
Id. This investigation includes an interview with the child and is intended to provide for an accurate determination
of whether hospitalization is necessary. Id. at 607. This decision is subject to periodic reviews. Id.
90. 9 So. 885 (Miss. 1891), overruled by Glaskox ex rel. Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992).
91. See Hewellette, 9 So. at 887 (holding a parent immune from a false-imprisonment suit brought by her
daughter in relation to her confinement in a mental institution).
92. See Irene Hansen Saba, ParentalImmunity from Liability in Tort: Evolution of a Doctrine in Tennessee,
36 U. MuM. L. REv. 829, 833 (2006).
93. Id. at 834.
94. See Wright v. Wright, 191 S.E. 2d 223, 224 (Va. 1972) (stating that the purpose of the doctrine is "to protect
parental discipline, domestic felicity, and family tranquility"). But see Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 636
(Me. 1979) (stating that the justification for immunity based on the preservation of family harmony "cannot
withstand close scrutiny" because "[s]o many exceptions and qualifications have evolved in application of the
rule ... that the asserted rationale can no longer serve as a valid basis for a sweeping denial of liability"); Briere v.
Briere, 224 A.2d 588, 591 (N.H. 1966) (arguing that prohibiting a child's personal-injury claim against a parent
while permitting other causes of action "is indeed not only to perpetuate confusion and irreconcilable decisions,
but to entrench a policy from which changing times have drained most of such vitality as it may have once
possessed" (citation omitted)).
95. Wallace v. Smyth, 786 N.E.2d 980,985 (111.2002).
96. Id. See generally Joseph J. Basgier, III, Children's Rights: A Renewed Call for the End of Parental
Immunity in Alabama and Arguments for the Further Expansion of a Child's Right to Sue, 26 LAw & PSYCHOL.
REV. 123, 124-28 (2002) (discussing the origins of and early justifications for the parental-immunity doctrine).
97. See, e.g., Emery v. Emery, 289 P.2d 218, 224 (Cal. 1955) (holding that emancipated daughters could
maintain a suit against their father for a willful tort).
98. See Sandra L. Haley, Comment, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is it a Defensible Defense?,
30 U. RICH. L. REv. 575, 581-92 (1996).
99. Verdier v. Verdier, 219 S.W.3d 143, 145 (Ark. 2005) (detailing the current status of parental immunity in
the U.S.).
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In the states that still subscribe to the parental-immunity doctrine, many courts
now take one of three approaches to determine whether immunity applies to
parents' tortious acts. The first approach grants immunity when the parent's
conduct is an exercise of parental discretion and authority.'" Actions that fall
within this category include conduct associated with the care, supervision, and
discipline of a child.'o' The second approach employs the reasonably prudent
parent standard, which looks at whether the discipline, punishment, or other action
taken by the parent is what an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent would have
done in similar circumstances. 0 2 The third approach, taken from the Second
Restatement of Torts, abolishes blanket immunity but leaves intact some privileges, such as the privilege of parental discipline. 10 3 Although courts are beginning
to apply stricter standards to parental authority, children's rights still remain
subordinate to their parents' wishes. The Supreme Court's 1995 decision in
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton'" forcefully reemphasized that minors'
liberty interests are limited, and stated that "[t]hey are subject, even as to their
physical freedom, to the control of their parents or guardians."' 0 5 While this case
concerned drug testing in schools,'c in many other settings the Supreme Court has

100. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1967); Wagner v. Smith, 340 N.W.2d 255, 256
(Iowa 1983) (adopting parental authority and discretion area of immunity); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921,
923 (Ky. 1971) (adopting zone of immunity as conduct within parental authority and discretion); Wright v.
Wright, 351 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (adopting zone of immunity that extends to acts within
parent's authority and discretion); Foldi v. Jeffries, 461 A.2d 1145, 1152 (N.J. 1983) (holding that immunity
attaches for conduct within the parent's discretion or authority); Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013, 1016 (R.I. 1982)
(utilizing parental-authority-and-discretion standard for protected conduct); Broadwell ex rel. Broadwell v.
Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471, 476-77 (Tenn. 1994) (operating vehicle that lead to child's death was not within
parental-authority exception); Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971) (adopting rationale that
activities within parent's discretion or authority are protected); Goller v. White, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (Wis. 1963).
101. Wallace, 786 N.E.2d at 985.
102. See, e.g., Broadbent ex rel. Broadbent v. Broadbent, 907 P.2d 43, 50 (Ariz. 1995) (en banc); Gibson v.
Gibson, 479 P.2d 648, 653 (Cal. 1971) (en banc). The court in West Shield Investigations & Security Consultants
v.Superior Court acknowledged that there are some limits to the actions that the transporters can take. 98 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 612 (Ct. App. 2000). In that case, Charleen Eymil brought numerous civil claims against her transporters
and the wilderness program she attended. Id. at 616. Eymil was able to maintain claims of intentional fraud and
concealment against the wilderness program. Id. at 625-26. The court emphasized that the program could act only
within the scope of lawful parental authority assigned to them by Eymil's parents. Id. at 626. The issue came down
to a determination of whether the program's actions were within the limits of what a reasonable and prudent
parent would have done. Id. Notably, Eymil conceded that the program was acting in loco parentis and thus
entitled the program to assert this defense of parental immunity. See id.
103. RESIATE;MENT (SECOND) oF ToRTs § 895G & cmt. k (1979) ("A parent or child is not immune from tort
liability to the other solely by reason of that relationship. Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish
liability for an act or omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is not
tortious."); see Winn v. Gilroy, 681 P.2d 776, 784 (Or. 1984) (abandoning blanket parental immunity and adopting
the Restatement approach); see also Haley, supra note 98, at 596 (explaining that the intent of the Restatement
approach was to allow parents flexibility in raising their children while still acknowledging the need for children
to have remedies against their parents for tortious conduct).
104. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
105. Id. at 654.
106. Id. at 648.
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yet to delineate what constitutes the proper balance of competing interests among
parents, children, and the state. 10 7
C. Child-ProtectionLaws
Although parents have significant authority to discipline their children as they
see fit, they must do so reasonably or risk violating the law. States use criminal
laws to protect children from acts that are unquestionably beyond the scope of
proper parental conduct. Child-abuse laws, for example, set minimum standards
for the care of children and limit the extent of corporal punishment that parents and
those standing in loco parentis0 8 are allowed to employ. Specifically, there has
been a reexamination of the appropriate use of restraints on children, arising from a
greater awareness of the long-term psychological and physical damage caused by
their use. Juveniles suspected or convicted of a crime have benefited from
increased restrictions on the nature and extent of restraints that may be utilized.
Other criminal laws, such as kidnapping and false imprisonment, as well as
false-imprisonment civil claims, afford general protections against taking people
against their will; however, special rules regarding consent limit their effectiveness
as applied to children.
1. Child Abuse
The federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA")'"9 defines
child abuse as an act "on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death
[or] serious physical or emotional harm." 0 This legislation consists of several
provisions that require states to implement standards that are substantively
consistent with the federal regulations in order to receive federal funding."' The
provisions of CAPTA, however, do not provide a mechanism under which to bring
a private cause of action.'12
Most child-abuse causes of action are prosecuted under state law," 3 and
although state laws vary, parental conduct must always remain reasonable. In
1987, a Wisconsin court acknowledged that parents retain very broad discretion
107. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231 (1972). See generally Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control
Children's Education?: Parents, Children, and the State, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1339 (2007).
108. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (2006), amended by CAPTA Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-320, 124 Stat. 3459.
110. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (Supp. 2011).
111. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(b) (2012).
112. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Fein v. District of Columbia, 93 F3d 861, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1996); A.S. ex rel. Blalock
v. Tellus, 22 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1224 (D. Kan. 1998).
113. See Breaking the Silence on Child Abuse: Protection, Prevention, Intervention, and Deterrence: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Children & Families of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 112th
Cong. (2011) (testimony of Teresa Huizar, Exec. Dir., National Children's Alliance), available at http://
www.help.senate.gov/imo/medialdoclHuizar.pdf ("98% of child abuse investigations and prosecutions occur at
the state/local level . . . .").
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over child-rearing, but they must exercise this discretion reasonably.' 14 Three
years later an Iowa court recognized that parents' punishment and disciplinary
measures must be reasonable.' 1 5 Similarly, a California court recognized that not
all parental acts of discipline are legal, and that a court should consider the intent
of the action and whether the action was reasonable."' 6 In addition, the California
Penal Code, like most child-abuse statutes, looks to both physical and mental
injury to determine liability.'" 7
The Government Accountability Office ("GAO") has recently addressed the
subject of restraints on children and whether their use constitutes child abuse." 8
Restraints pose several health threats; studies indicate that hundreds of children
have died or suffered serious physical injury due to being restrained improperly or
for unreasonable periods of timell 9 and that being restrained can cause psychological damage. 2 In general, there are three types of restraints-physical,' 2 ' mechanical,1 2 2 and chemicall 2 3 -but schools and transportation services primarily use
physical and mechanical restraints.
In schools, the use of restraints arises in two overlapping settings: corporal
punishment and special education. Federal laws do not restrict the use of restraints
in public and private schools, and laws are widely divergent at the state level.' 24

114.
115.
116.
117.

State v. Teynor, 414 N.W.2d
State v. Siemer, 454 N.W.2d
People v. Checketts, 84 Cal.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a(b)

76, 80 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
857, 862 (Iowa 1990).
Rptr. 2d 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1999).
(West 2008).

Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to produce great bodily
harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable
physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or
permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or willfully causes or permits that child to
be placed in a situation where his or her person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Id.
118. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-719T, SECLUSIONS AND RESTRAINTS: SELECTED CASES OF
DEATH AND ABUSE AT PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND TREATMENT CENTERS 1(2009), available at http://www.

gao.gov/assets/130/1225 26.pdf.
119. Id. at 5.
120. EMILY BANKS ETAL., UNIV. OF FLA. LEVIN COLL. OF LAW, SHACKLING OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS: THE DEBATE
IN JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICY (2008), available at http://www.law.ufl.edu/pdf/academics/centers-clinics/centers/

shackling.pdf.
121. Arthur R. Block, Restraints, Seclusion and Aversives, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, lI TH ANNUAL
SCHOOL LAW INSTrrUTE 117, 120 (2011) (defining a physical restraint as the use of bodily force to cause a
"restriction that immobilizes or reduces the ability of an individual to move the individual's arms, legs, body, or
head freely").
122. Id. (defining a mechanical restraint as "the use of devices as a means of restricting a [child]'s freedom of
movement").
123. Id. at 121 (describing a chemical restraint as the use of an unprescribed "drug or medication .. . to control
behavior or restrict freedom of movement").
124. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SUMMARY OF SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT STATUTES, REGULATIONS, POLICIES AND

GUIDANCE, BY STATE AND TERRITORY (2010), available at http://www.ed.gov/policy/seclusion/summary-by-

state.pdf.
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Even today, the use of corporal punishment in private schools may be justified by
the doctrine of in loco parentis.12 5 Because "[c]ourts consistently affirm that
parents are privileged 'to administer such reasonable and timely punishment as
may be necessary to correct faults in [their] growing children,"' 2 6 this privilege
has been extended to teachers who are often held to stand in loco parentis to their
students.'2 7
In some cases, constitutional claims against the use of restraints have been
limited because courts are reluctant to find constitutional violations for actions that
could be remedied under state tort law. In Ingraham v. Wright,' 28 for example, the
Supreme Court ruled that corporal punishment in public schools does not violate
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.12 9 The Court
nevertheless held that "the traditional common-law remedies are fully adequate to
afford due process." 3 0 But the use of restraints may violate the Due Process
Clause if their use is found to be unreasonable.131
Additionally, courts give parents wide discretion in the upbringing and education of their children. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held
that "parents' liberty interest in directing the upbringing and education of their
children includes the right to discipline them by using reasonable, nonexcessive
corporal punishment, and to delegate that parental authority to private school
officials." 32 Thus, in states allowing corporal punishment generally, physical
restraints may be employed in a reasonable manner for this purpose. 133 Since
Ingraham, however, thirty-one states have completely banned corporal punishment in public schools,134 including the use of restraints as punishment. Even

125. 78A C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 1110 (2013); see also Timothy Garrison, From Parent to
Protector: The History of Corporal Punishment in American Public Schools, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 115,
118-19 (2007) (explaining that, although corporal punishment is justified in some public schools as well, parens
patriae is the rationale more often used in this context).
126. Garrison, supra note 125, at 116 (quoting Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 44 S.E.2d 419, 423 (Va. 1947)).
127. See, e.g., Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d I151, 1158-59 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that, although the school
principal stood in loco parentis, his acts of breaking through a locked bathroom door and throwing a student
against the wall may have exceeded the reasonably-necessary-for-discipline standard).
128. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
129. Id. at 671.
130. Id. at 672.
131. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987). Courts are likely to find
that the use of seclusion or restraint is unreasonable if such use "shocks the conscience." See, e.g., Orange v. Cnty.
of Grundy, 950 F Supp. 1365, 1373 (E.D. Tenn. 1996).
132. Doe v. Heck, 327 F3d 492, 523 (7th Cir. 2003).
133. See, e.g., T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd., 610 F.3d 588, 602 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding that a teacher's
repeated use of physical restraint against an autistic student was not excessive corporal punishment because it was
related directly to disciplining and correcting the student's behavior); Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1337
(I Ith Cir. 2007) (holding that a teacher did not use excessive corporal punishment when she physically restrained
a student by grabbing his neck and squeezing in order to prevent him from leaving the room without permission).
134. Alison Bath, Despite Opposition, Paddling Students Allowed in 19 States, USA ToDAY (Apr. 23, 2012
6:02 PM), http://www.usatoday.connews/nation/story/2012-04-22/school-corporal-punishment/54475676/ 1; see
also Jerry R. Parkinson, Federal Court Treatment of Corporal Punishment in Public Schools: Jurisprudence that
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though there is controversy regarding whether corporal punishment should be
permitted in schools, certain school district regulations still allow it,13 5 and courts
usually uphold such conduct as reasonable.1 36
Physical and mechanical restraints are used frequently in the special-education
setting. In 2009, the GAO released a report discussing the use of restraints in
public and private schools and treatment centers as well as the consequences of
the unregulated use of such restraints.137 The GAO found "hundreds of cases of
alleged abuse and death related to the use of these methods on school children
during the past two decades."' 38 These restraint techniques are dangerous "because they may involve physical struggling, pressure on the chest, or other
interruptions in breathing."' 3 1 In addition, the GAO found that children can suffer
severe emotional trauma from being restrained, bringing the use of restraints
within the purview of child-abuse statutes.14 0
In public school special-education settings, the majority of court decisions and
agencies, such as the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Education,
have deemed employing any type of mechanical restraint to be unacceptable and
"in clear violation of a student's individual rights."' 4 1 And in March 2010, the
House of Representatives passed H.R. 4247, which directed the Secretary of
Education to establish minimum standards restricting the use of seclusion and
restraint in both public and private schools.1 4 2 H.R. 4247, as passed by the House,
would require the Secretary of Education to promulgate regulations "in order to
protect each student from physical or mental abuse, aversive behavioral interventions that compromise student health and safety, or any physical restraint or
seclusion imposed solely for purposes of discipline or convenience...."143
Further, the Children's Health Act of 2000'" established national standards for the

Is Literally Shocking to the Conscience, 39 S.D. L. REv. 276, 279 & n.30 (1994) (listing states which had banned
corporal punishment as of 1994).
135. See, e.g., CLAY CNTY. BD. OF EDuC., STUDENT RESTRAINT/SECLUSION/SOLATION

POLICY (2006), avail-

able at http://web.archive.org/web/20080725030724/http://www.hayesvillems.org/handbook/restraint-policy.
htm; HENDERSON CNTY. BD. OF EDUC., ScHooL BOARD OPERATIONS § 6.314 (2010), availableat http://boardpolicy.net/
documents/files/henderson/6314.pdf; Poffr ARTHUR ISD, BOARD POLICY MANUAL: STUDENT DISCIPLINE (2011),

availableat http://pol.tasb.org/Policy/Download/723?filename= FO(LOCAL).pdf; see also Bath, supranote 134.
136. See, e.g., Daniels v. Lutz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1046-47 (E.D. Ark. 2005); Sims v. Bd. of Educ.,
329 F. Supp. 678, 690 (D.N.M 1971); Willoughby v. Lehrbass, 388 N.W.2d 688,697-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
137. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFMCE, supra note 118.
138. Id. at Introduction.
139. Id. at 1.
140. Id.
141. Joseph B. Ryan & Reece L. Peterson, Physical Restraint in School, 29 BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 154, 160
(2004); see, e.g., Jefferson v. Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F.2d 303, 305 (5th Cir. 1987) ("A young student who is
not being properly punished or disciplined has a constitutional right not to be lashed to a chair through the school
day and denied, among other things, the basic liberty of access to the bathroom when needed.").
142. Keeping All Students Safe Act, H.R. 4247, 111 th Cong. (2010).
143. Id. § 5.
144. Pub. L. No. 106-310, 114 Stat. 1101 (codified in scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
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use of physical restraints on children in psychiatric facilities and prohibited the use
of certain restraints. 145 Moreover, regarding the care of mentally ill patients, the
federal district court in the seminal case, Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. King, 14 6 held that
staff working with these patients required specific training regarding interventions
germane to their unique care.14 7
The use of restraints is concerning not only in the school context, but also
in the juvenile-offender setting, in which the use of handcuffs and shackles is
similarly problematic. The concern is that the "handcuffing and shackling of
children can cause them serious mental and emotional harm, and undermine the
court's very objectives in preventing delinquency or rehabilitating a child."' 48
In 2007, the Third Judicial District Court of New Mexico entered an order
that prohibited children appearing in court from being restrained with any
device, including handcuffs, unless a prior determination indicates a specific
individual need. 14 9 Even though law enforcement has an interest in restraining
juveniles in the criminal-justice system, courts are recognizing that the harm
from shackling may outweigh the benefit. 5 0 Thus, the trend seems to be moving
toward eliminating the use of restraints on children in all contexts because of the
physical and psychological harm that they inflict-i.e., the very definition of child
abuse.' 5 '

145. 42 U.S.C. §290ii (2006).
146. 793 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
147. Id. at 1067-68.
148. BANKS ET AL., supra note 120, at 3.

149. In re Use of Physical Restraints on Respondent Children, No. CS-2007-01 (N.M. Third Jud. Dist. Ct.
Sept. 17, 2007) (temporary emergency order establishing procedures for the use of physical restraints), reported
in Court Orderfor Youth Shackles, LAS CRUCES SUN-NEWS (Sept. 21, 2007), http://www.1csun-news.com/news/
ci_6959696; see also BANKS ET AL., supra note 120, at 10.
150. See, e.g., AMENDMENT TO THE TRIAL COURT OF THE COMMONWEALTh COURT OFFICER POLICY AND
PROCEDURES MANUAL 3, availableat http://www.youthadvocacydepartment.orglabout/shacklingpolicy.pdf (summarizing the law of several jurisdictions); Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 375 (Ct. App. 2007)
("The use of shackles in a courtroom absent a case-by-case, individual showing of need creates the very tone of
criminality juvenile proceedings were intended to avoid."). See generally People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302,
1321-22 (Cal. 1991) (discussing California case law).
151. See BANKS ETAL., supra note 120, at 11. For example:
The Vermont law mandates that when the state transports a child who is in the custody of the state,
all reasonable and appropriate measures consistent with safety must be made to transport or escort
the person in a manner which prevents physical and psychological trauma, respects the privacy of
the individual, and represents the least restrictive means necessary for the safety of the person
being transported. The recent legislation adds a provision stipulating that mechanical restraints are
not to be routinely used during transport, but may be used if circumstances warrant and the reasons
are documented in writing.
Id.; see also H.B. 156, 130th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2013) ("A BILL ... to require restraints to be
removed from an alleged or adjudicated delinquent child prior to the commencement of ajuvenile court hearing or
proceeding unless the court determines that the use of restraints is necessary to prevent physical harm to the child
or another person or to prevent the child from escaping.").
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2. Kidnapping and False Imprisonment
To prove a violation of the federal kidnapping statute, the government must
show that a person (1) willfully and knowingly (2) transported in interstate
commerce (3) an unconsenting person (4) who is held for "ransom or reward or
otherwise." 1 5 2 Courts have interpreted "otherwise" very broadly, holding that the
kidnapping need not be for an illegal purpose. 1 5 3
An important aspect of kidnapping is that the transportation must be against
the will of the victim. Children up to a certain age are held to lack recognizable
will, so their parents' will controls.1 54 Courts have declined to set a definitive age
at which the child's will controls,' 5 ' but the Supreme Court has recognized the age
of fourteen as a rebuttable baseline.15 6 The federal kidnapping statute excludes
parents of minor children from prosecution under the law, but that exemption is not
ironclad. 157
Like kidnapping, false imprisonment involves intentionally restraining or confining a person without consent or legal authority and may include independent
criminal and civil claims.t -8 However, kidnapping requires the additional element

152. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012); United States v. McBryar, 553 F2d 433, 433 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam)
(summarizing and applying the federal kidnapping statute to a driver who, in an attempt to receive sexual
gratification, refused to let a female passenger exit his vehicle). In addition to transporting a person across state
lines, federal jurisdiction can be established in four other ways, see 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)-(5), but they are not
applicable in the youth-transportation context. State kidnapping statutes similarly involve elements of restraint
and consent, using language such as "without lawful authority," GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-40(a) (2011), or "has
neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so," IOWA CODE §710.1 (2001).
153. See United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1964) (reasoning that the language of the statute suggests
no distinction based on the ultimate purpose of a kidnapping); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 (1936)
(stating that Congress's addition of the word "otherwise" indicated its intent that the statute be given a broad
application); United States v. Jones, 808 F.2d 561, 565-66 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[A]ny purpose, moral or immoral,
satisfies the kidnapping statute . . . .").
154. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 710.1 (2001) (stating that kidnapping occurs when a person "confines a person or
removes a person from one place to another, knowing that the person who confines or removes the other person
has neither the authority nor the consent of the other to do so," and requiring that one other element is present,
including ransom, hostage, sexual abuse, secrecy, or interference with government function); Chatwin v. United
States, 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946) ("If the victim is of such an age or mental state as to be incapable of having a
recognizable will, the confinement then must be against the will of the parents or legal guardian of the victim.");
United States v. McCabe, 812 F.2d 1060, 1062 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a twenty-three-month-old child did
not have "recognizable will").
155. See Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 461-62 (finding that there is no per se age of incapacity and holding that a
fifteen-year-old did have recognizable will). Some states set statutory age limits. See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 135.00(1)
(McKinney 2012) (sixteen years old); N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-39(a) (2011) (sixteen years old); OHio REV. CODE ANN.
§2905.1(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) (thirteen years old); VT. STAr. ANN. tit. 13, §2404(4)(A) (2009) (sixteen
years old).
156. Charwin, 326 U.S. at 461 & n.4.
157. 18 U.S.C § 1201(g)-(h) (2012) (providing that parents whose rights have been terminated may be
convicted of kidnapping); see also State v. McLaughlin, 611 P.2d 92 (Ariz. 1980) (en banc) (upholding conviction
of a mother, who had lost custody of her children, for kidnapping them with the assistance of an agent).
158. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §565.130(1) (2000) ("A person commits the crime of false imprisonment if he
knowingly restrains another unlawfully and without consent so as to interfere substantially with his liberty.").
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that the confinement be carried out for the purpose of obtaining an objective or
benefit.' Therefore, false imprisonment is generally treated as a lesser-included
offense within kidnapping."o Civil false imprisonment is closely related. It
requires that a person act with the intent of confining another, that this act results
in a confinement, and that the victim is conscious of the confinement or is harmed
by it.''
While parents are granted wide authority and are afforded great deference when
it comes to transporting and confining their children, their power is not without
limits. Both federal and state courts have held that parental authority ends when it
is exercised for an unlawful purpose.1 6 2 A typical restriction is that any confinement or other disciplinary measure must be reasonable.' 6 3 As with kidnapping,
issues of consent are also often implicated in false imprisonment, both in terms of
the child's consent and a parent's consent for a third party to confine or transport

the child.16 4
D. Parallels:Juvenile-Offender and Private-PrisonerTransport Industries
In addition to the particular legal issues involved in the youth-transportation
process, broader issues arise, such as safety conditions and the inherent risk of

159. See State v. Ortega, 817 P.2d 1196, 1212 (N.M. 1991) (detailing the differences between the two crimes),
abrogated on other grounds by Kersey v. Hatch, 237 P.3d 683 (N.M. 2010).
160. See, e.g., State v. Sanborn, 533 So. 2d 1169, 1170 (Fla. 1988); Ortega, 817 P.2d at 1212. Compare
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 787.02(1)(a) (West 2007) ("The term 'false imprisonment' means forcibly, by threat, or secretly
confining, abducting, imprisoning, or restraining another person without lawful authority and against her or his
will."), with id. § 787.01(l)(a) ("The term 'kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, orby threat confining, abducting,
or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to: 1. Hold for
ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage. 2. Commit or facilitate commission of any felony. 3. Inflict bodily
harm upon or to terrorize the victim or another person. 4. Interfere with the performance of any governmental or
political function.").
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF Tol<rs

§ 35

(1965).

162. See People v. Checketts, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 491, 492-93 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a parent who confines
a child with the intent to endanger the health or safety of the child or for an unlawful purpose can be prosecuted for
false imprisonment); People v. Senior, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 14, 24 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the defendant's right to
physical custody of his child ended when he exercised it for an unlawful purpose).
163. See State v. Kinchen, 963 P.2d 928, 929 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (finding that, upon objective review, a
parent can be found guilty of unlawful imprisonment if the restrictions on the child's movement were "excessive,
immoderate, or unreasonable"); State v. Teynor, 414 N.W.2d 76, 80 (Wis. 1987) (noting that, while parents can
confine their children in order to control their whereabouts and daily activities, parents must exercise this
authority reasonably).
164. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.140 (2000) ("A person does not commit false imprisonment under section
565.130 if the person restrained is a child under the age of seventeen and ... [a] parent, guardian or other person
responsible for the general supervision of the child's welfare has consented to the restraint .... ); Kellar v. Wills,
186 F. App'x 714, 715 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that a student could not maintain a falseimprisonment claim against her therapeutic school because her parents consented to her enrollment with full
knowledge of the school's programs and restrictions); Blair v. Wills, 420 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting
that, in examining whether a sixteen-year-old boy's confinement at a boarding school was without consent or legal
justification, the court should look to whether the parents consented to his treatment and confinement at the
school).

2014]1

KIDNAPPING INCORPORATED

583

abuse in unregulated environments. The federal and state governments have
previously recognized these issues-and comprehensively addressed them-in
both the juvenile-offender and private-prisoner transport industries. These industries provide appropriate analogies to the youth-transport industry because of the
comparable safety risks to both the transporters and the transportees. Certainly
differences exist between the youth-transport industry and these two industries. In
the youth-transport context, for example, the state has an even greater interest in
regulating the industry because the rights and welfare of minors not even charged
with a crime are implicated. Moreover, transporting these types of minors raises
fewer public-safety concerns up front than transporting convicted felons and even
non-convicted juvenile offenders. Finally, state action is involved in the juvenileoffender context. Despite these differences, the general premise is the same:
societal needs were perceived, services and industries were created, accidents and
explicit violations occurred as a result of no regulation or lax enforcement, and
ultimately state legislatures stepped in to attempt to ensure the well-being of all
parties involved. This Section begins with a brief history of the juvenile-justice
system, including modern-day regulation of juvenile-offender transportation, and
concludes with a discussion of the private-prisoner transport industry.
The treatment of juvenile offenders has changed drastically over the last two
centuries, creating a juvenile-justice system that incorporates strong regulations
for the transportation of juvenile offenders. In the United States, originally
juveniles were tried in the same manner as adult offenders.' 65 Yet, while juvenile
offenders were tried in adult courts, juries would rarely convict for a minor offense
on account of the defendant's age.1 6 6 Instead of focusing on punishment, the
prevailing ideal during the 1820s centered on reform for juveniles and on
preventing "pauperism."' 6 7 The reality of juvenile custodial institutions, however,
has rarely lived up to the rehabilitation goals touted by juvenile courts.' 6 8
The first reformatory juvenile institution, the House of Refuge, was established
in New York City in 1825.169 The House of Refuge provided a place to send
juvenile paupers, including many who had not committed a single criminal offense
but were considered potential criminals on the sole basis of their poverty. 7 0
Commitment to the institution could be initiated by a parent or through a city order,
usually without any investigation into the family situation.' 7 ' Once admitted, the

165. THOMAS I. BERNARD & MEGAN C. KURLYCHEK, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 33 (2d ed. 2010).
166. Id. at 51.
167. Id. The theory of pauperism was that crime was a result of the "undeserving" poor, who were in poverty
because of their wicked ways. See generally id. at 48-52.
168. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. Riv. 691, 716 (1991) (noting that
both historical and "[clontemporary evaluations of juvenile institutions reveal a continuing gap between
rehabilitative rhetoric and punitive reality").
169. BERNARD & KURLYCHEK, supra note 165, at 52-53.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 53.
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youths were required to remain committed until the age of twenty-one, regardless
of whether they had been convicted of a crime. 7 2 As the institutions reached
capacity, most juveniles were sent to the West as indentured servants, and many
children were never heard from again. 173 These types of institutions, and the
problems associated with them, spread throughout the country during the 1800s.174
Following a public outcry over the conditions of reform institutions in Chicago,
the Illinois legislature established the first juvenile-court system in 1899." This
system expanded the state's authority over children by granting the new juvenile
courts coercive power to implement the "help" necessary to reform troubled
youths.17 6 Within twenty-five years, all but two states had followed the Illinois
example and developed a separate court system for young offenders. 77
As the notion of a separate juvenile-court system expanded throughout the
nation, the need to transport juvenile offenders within the system increased. To
protect juveniles during transport, the federal and state governments, as well as the
American Bar Association ("ABA") and the United Nations ("UN"), have promulgated safety regulations. The ABA, for example, has published model standards
for the transport of juvenile offenders, including that "[a]ll police departments
should establish a unit or officer specifically trained for work with juveniles."17 8 In
addition, the UN has developed specific rules for the protection of juvenile
offenders during transport.179 Its comprehensive model states that "[tihe transport
of juveniles should be carried out ... with adequate ventilation and light, in
conditions that should in no way subject them to hardship or indignity," and that
juveniles "should not be transferred from one facility to another arbitrarily." 8 0
Juveniles facing federal detention are protected by mandatory safety standards
that specifically address the issue of transportation. Those involved in the transportation of federally detained juveniles must "[i]nspect security vehicles used to
transport juvenile detainees to ensure they are equipped with the following: first
aid kits, fire extinguishers, seat belts that anchor securely, instructions for actions
172. Id.
173. Id. at 55-56.
174. See id. at 59; see also id. at 57-59 (describing the case of Mary Ann Crouse, a young girl who was
committed to the Philadelphia House of Refuge over the objections of her father and despite the fact that she had
never committed a crime).
175. Id. at 33, 75-76. For the historical context preceding juvenile courts, including indentured servitude and
reformation, see generally id. at 48-70.
176. Id. at 71; see also Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 971 (1995) (describing the vast discretion of the judge and the elimination of
procedural safeguards).
177. Alexander S. ex rel. Bowers v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773,781 (D.S.C. 1995) (citing JAMEs 0. FINCKENAUER,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CORRECTIONs-THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE 116 (1984)).
178. INsT. OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO POLICE HANDLING OF JUVENILE

PROBLEMS § 4.1 (1979).
179. United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Their Liberty, G.A. Res. 45/113,

U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/113 (Dec. 14, 1990).
180. Id. 26.
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to take in case of an emergency/breakdown, documentation of completion of
repairs, and documentation of regular maintenance."' 8 '
At the state level, the standards for the transportation of juvenile offenders
vary. Virginia, for example, has specific guidelines for transporting juveniles in
detention, including the requirement that transporters not be "suspected of or
charged with criminal acts."' 8 2 Juveniles in Massachusetts are afforded the same
protections as all other prisoners, and are transported by police cruiser whenever possible.'8 3 Vermont has a more progressive set of guidelines, requiring,
inter alia, that (1) the least-restrictive method of transport reasonable to the
situation be used, (2) the transport be private and have at least one person known
to the child, and (3) the transporters be subject to criminal checks and safety
inspections.184 The regulations in Cincinnati, Ohio contain the uncommon requirement that all juveniles "remain handcuffed during all phases of transportation and
processing."'5
The private-prisoner transport industry provides the second analogy to the
youth-transportation industry. In the late 1980s, private prisons emerged in
response to the drastic increase in the U.S. prison population.'" Private prisons
were created as a purported solution to state-prison overcrowding and were
claimed to be more cost effective in delivering correctional services.' 8 1 Many
concerns arose, however, regarding the potential mistreatment of prisoners in
private prisons because such environments are concealed from public view and

181. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE FEDERAL PERFORMANCE-BASED DETENTION STANDARDS HANDBOOK

§ C.1

(2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ofdt/juvenile.pdf (containing numerous checklists for ensuring the safety and control of juvenile offenders in federal care).
182. See VA. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR TRANSPORTING JUVENILES IN DETENTION 2 (2004),
available at http://townhall.virginia.gov/1/GetFile.cfm?File= C:\TownHall\docroot\GuidanceDocs\777\G
Doc_DJJ_3652_vi.pdf (implementing guidelines, the purpose of which is "to ensure the safety of detained
juveniles and the staff who transport them; protect the public safety through appropriate security and supervision
practices; and reduce the liability exposure of those who are responsible for transporting detained juveniles,"
pursuant to 6 VA. ADMIN CODE § 35-150-260 (2011)).
183. E.g., TRURO POLICE DEP'T, TRANSPORTATION OF PRISONERS 7 (2005), available at http://www.truropolice.orgl
On%2OLine%2OManuals/Transportation%200f%20Prisoners.pdf.
184. VT. DEP'T FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TRANSPORTATION OF YOUTH IN DCF CUSTODY 1-3 (2006), available
at http://dcf.vermont.gov/sites/dcf/files/pdf/fsd/policies/1 50_Transportation.ofYouth_.pdf; see also TENN. DEP'T
OF CHILDREN'S SERVS., GUIDELINES FOR TRANSPORTATION OF CHILD/YOUTH BY REGIONAL EMPLOYEES I (2014),
available at http://www.tn.gov/youth/dcsguide/policies/chap3l/31.15.pdf ("Any employee trained in search
techniques and the use of mechanical restraints may be required to transport [a] delinquent child/youth.").
I85. CINCINNATI POLICE DEP'T, PROCESSING JUVENILE OFFENDERs 7 (2013), available at http://www.cincinnatioh.gov/policelassets/File/Procedures/12900.pdf.
186. See Rachel Christine Bailie Antonuccio, Note, Prisons for Profit: Do the Social and Political Problems
Have a Legal Solution?, 33 J. COR. L. 577, 578, 583 (2008). See generally IRA P. ROBBINS, THE LEGAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE INCARCERATION (1988).
187. Ira P.Robbins, Privatizationof Corrections: Defining the Issues, 40 VAND. L. REv. 813, 813-17 (1987);
Mary Sigler, Private Prisons, Public Functions, and the Meaning of Punishment, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 149,
149-50 (2010).
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house a population of politically powerless and unpopular people.'8
In conjunction with the perceived need for and creation of private prisons,
private-prisoner transport companies emerged.' 89 These private-transport services
subjected prisoners to the same risk of abuse that exists in private prisons.' 0 The
co-founders of Fugitive One Transport Company, for example, were charged with
raping a female prisoner they were transporting.' 9 ' In a similar occurrence, a guard
reportedly sexually assaulted a female prisoner whom his company was transporting from Nevada to a Colorado jail.19 2 Prior to being hired by the private-transport
company Extradition International, the transportation guard had been fired from
the Texas prison system for assaulting another prisoner.' 93 Extradition International knew of the guard's violent history, but hired him anyway.19 4 The company
ultimately settled a lawsuit brought by the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU"), which had alleged that the transportation company "failed to train or
supervise [its] staff appropriately, allowing the assault to occur."' 9 5 In addition,
the company was "operat[ing] illegally by transporting prisoners without proper
licensing or insurance." 9 6 David C. Fathi, co-counsel in the lawsuit and staff
attorney at the ACLU's National Prison Project stated: "This case provides an

188. David C. Fathi, The Challenge of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1453, 1453 (2010); see supra
Part I.B (discussing children's rights and explaining that children share the characteristics of a politically
powerless group).
189. Examples of private prisoner-transport companies include TRANSCOR AMERICA, LLC, http://www.transcor.
com (last visited Mar. 14, 2014), and U.S. PRISONER TRANSPORT, INC., http://usprisonertransport.com/ (last visited

Mar. 14, 2014).
190. On abuse in private prisons, see, for example, Ira P. Robbins, Privatisation of Corrections: A Violation of
U.S. Domestic Law, International Human Rights, and Good Sense, in PRIVATISATION AN) HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE

AGE OF GLOBALISATION 57, 74-75 (Koen De Feyter & Felipe G6mez Isa eds., 2005) (describing some abuses in
the United States and abroad); Alyssa Figueroa, 5 Shocking Revelations About Hellish Private Juvenile Prisons
and the Man Who Profits From Them, AI.TERNET (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/5-shockingrevelations-about-hellish-private-juvenile-prisons-and-man-who-profits (stating that "[slexual assault is ... rampant" at a particular private juvenile facility in Georgia); Brendan Fischer, Violence, Abuse, and Death at
For-Profit Prisons: A GEO Group Rap Sheet, PRWATCH (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2013/09/
12255/violence-abuse-and-death-profit-prisons-geo-group-rap-sheet (discussing allegations of prisoner abuse
and sexual assault at private adult and juvenile facilities); Chris Kirkham, Private Prison Empire Rises Despite
Startling Record ofJuvenile Abuse, HUTINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2013), http://projects.huffingtonpost.com/prisonersof-profit (describing abuses at a private juvenile-detention facility); Ian Urbina, Hawaii to Remove Inmates Over
Abuse Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25,2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/us/26kentucky.html ("[I]nvestigators found that at least five corrections officials at the [Kentucky] prison, including a chaplain, had been
charged with having sex with inmates in the last three years, and four were convicted.").
191. Alex Friedmann, US: Private Transportation Firms Take Prisoners for a Ride, CORI' WATCH (Nov. 1,
1997), http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=863.
192. See Press Release, ACLU, Private Prisoner Transport Company Pays Damages in Lawsuit Over Sexual
Assault and Death Threats Against Woman (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/prisoners-rights/
private-prisoner-transport-company-pays-damages-lawsuit-over-sexual-assault-and-dea (discussing Darbyshire
v. Extraditions Int'l, Inc., which was filed by the ACLU in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado).
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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excellent example of why contracting with private for-profit companies to conduct
correctional functions can be dangerous to prisoners and the public."l 9 7
Further, lack of regulations concerning the maintenance of private-transport
vehicles and other transport conditions subjected prisoners to various other abuses.
For example, private-transport guards reportedly ignored strange noises coming
from the transport van, which had logged over 260,000 miles.' 9 8 Trapped in the
van's wire-mesh cage, six prisoners burned alive when the van caught fire due to
disrepair.' 9 9 When this tragedy occurred in 1997, "there [were] more regulatory
guidelines for shipping cattle or other commodities across state lines than for
extraditing prisoners," and the "lack of safety standards and government oversight
of the prisoner transport industry ... had deadly consequences." 2 0
In response to such incidents of prisoner mistreatment by private-transportation
companies, Congress passed legislation in 2000 requiring that the Attorney
General promulgate strict rules for the private-prisoner transportation industry.
The Interstate Transportation of Dangerous Criminals Act of 2000,201 otherwise
known as Jeanna's Act, mandates, among other things, that private-prisoner
transport companies: adopt pre-employment screening measures for all potential
employees; require employee training in six areas; follow a guard-to-prisoner
ratio; and comply with standards set forth to ensure the safety of prisoners during
transport. 2 0 2 Pursuant to this statute, the Attorney General promulgated more
detailed rules and stricter standards for the private-prisoner transport industry.2 03
The underlying problems and abuses addressed by the juvenile-offender and
private-prisoner transport statutes are now occurring in the youth-transportation
industry as well. That these youths have not been convicted of any crimes makes
these abuses even more disturbing. The circumstances surrounding the private
transportation of youths heighten the likelihood of abuse and unsafe conditions,
while at the same time protecting the transportation companies from liability via
their contracts. Therefore, the industry greatly needs regulations similar to those
implemented in the analogous industries.

II. POOR REGULATION

IN THE YOUTH-TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY

OPENS THE

DOOR TO POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES
Youth-transportation companies have existed for decades, but the industry
remains relatively unknown and almost completely unregulated despite the violations of children's rights that occur within the system. From the moment that

197. Id.
198. Friedmann, supra note 191.

199. Id.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Pub. L. No. 106-560, 114 Stat. 2784 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13726b (2006)).
Id.
28 C.F.R. § 97.20 (2013).
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parents delegate their parental rights to the transport companies to the time that
the children are delivered to the behavior-modification facilities, many children
experience severe physical and emotional trauma. Some experience a sense of
abandonment, wondering why their parents have sent them away; others fear that
they are actually being kidnapped. Even if these psychological harms do not occur,
the likelihood of physical abuse in the form of aggressive restraints or unsafe
traveling conditions remains.
The industry lacks adequate regulation, likely due in part to the difficulty in
applying current law to private youth transportation because many of the relevant
laws were contemplated in different, more traditional contexts. Power-of-attorney
contracts, for example, originally used to delegate parental authority temporarily
when a parent was unavailable or incapacitated, are now used to shift parental
authority and immunity to transportation companies. Through this modem application, transporters-acting with parental authority and cloaked in parental immunity, yet strangers with no historical or emotional connections to their chargescan take children against their will using physical force, bounded only by the legal
limitations placed on parents, who presumably know and love their children.
A. ParentalDelegation ofAuthority to Youth TransportersThrough Power of
Attorney Is Inconsistent with the Purposeof Power-of-Attorney Statutes
The risk of abuse in the youth-transportation industry is rampant as a result of
parents' unfettered ability to delegate their authority to these companies. The
companies usually obtain nearly unrestricted authority over children via power-ofattorney or temporary-guardianship clauses in their contracts. 2 04 These clauses
give transportation companies the same immunity that parents enjoy, thus preventing children who are abused during transport from seeking recourse. To curb
the transport industry's authority and to protect the best interests of the child,
regulations should require a neutral fact-finder's consent before a child can be sent
to a behavior-modification facility, and states should limit the amount of authority
that parents can delegate to these companies in the first place.
The delegation of parental authority to transport companies has several negative
ramifications for children. One such implication is that children are unable to bring
their plight to anyone's attention because their ability to contact the outside world
is effectively eliminated once they arrive at a therapeutic school.20 5 Without proof
of child abuse, which is often difficult to obtain, there is essentially no recourse for

204. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (describing the process by which parental authority is
delegated).
205. See Lou Kilzer, ParentsHire Firms to Lock Up Teens, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Nov. 27, 1998, at D3
(quoting a lawyer who said that "[b]asically, parents who have legal custody of their children can determine where
to send their children, and that decision is not reviewable unless some party brings it to a court's attention").
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the children affected.206 In effect, children are at the whim of their parents, and
third parties have little success when attempting to enforce rights on children's
behalf.
Further complicating the problem, the act of delegating parental authority to a
corporate third party for the sole purpose of transporting the child to a behaviormodification school runs contrary to the intent of many power-of-attorney statutes.
Those statutes were originally designed to enable a parent who was temporarily
unavailable to empower a close relative to take any emergency action regarding
the child during the parent's absence. 207 The use of powers of attorney in
non-emergency situations to delegate parental authority to transporters-strangers
with no relation to the children--clearly exceeds the original scope of these
statutes.
This usage of powers of attorney not only surpasses the intended purpose of the
statutes, but also may be unenforceable under the principles set forth in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Under the Restatement, contracts affecting
the right to custody of a minor are unenforceable if they are not in the best interests
of the child.20 8 This reasoning should also apply to contracts affecting the
temporary guardianship of a minor. There is currently no guarantee that transport
to a behavior-modification school is in the child's best interest. With parents able to
make this decision unilaterally, the only way to ensure that the best interests of the
child are met is through a neutral examination of the facts.
In order to protect children from arbitrary confinement, a neutral fact-finder
should be required to approve a parent's decision to transfer a child to a private
behavior-modification facility. In contrast to parents' unfettered ability to send
their children to behavior-modification facilities, 209 parents must obtain approval
from a neutral fact-finder before committing their children to state-run mental
hospitals, as required by Parham v. J.R.2 10 The incongruity of this situation is
highlighted by the fact that state-operated hospitals are regulated and subject to
minimum standards, whereas behavior-modification schools and the transportation
of juveniles to them are largely unregulated. Without a neutral fact-finder, there is
effectively no way to guarantee that children are protected from arbitrary and
inappropriate actions by their parents.
The transporters' activities are legal only because they operate with parental
authority and are cloaked in parental immunity. To prevent third parties from
acting with impunity, states should limit the authority and legal protections that

206. See id.; see also supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing the experience of David
van Blarigan).
207. UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS ACT § 1-107 cmt. (1982) (explaining that powers of
attorney were "designed to reduce problems relating to consents for emergency treatment").
208. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§

191 (1981).

209. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
210. 442 U.S. 584,606-07 (1979)
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transporter contracts confer. Unless states narrowly construe power-of-attorney
statutes to comport with their intended scope and require a neutral fact-finder to
ensure that transfer is in the child's best interest, these contracts should be found
unenforceable. Without the protections conferred by these contracts, transporters
would be guilty of kidnapping and false imprisonment and liable for numerous
torts.
B. The CircumstancesSurrounding Youth Transport Often Constitute
Child Abuse
Even with the current parental immunity enjoyed by youth-transportation companies, transporters may still be guilty of child abuse. Throughout the transportation process, many youths experience unjustifiable physical pain and mental suffering willfully caused by the transporters.2 1 1 Children taken from their beds in the
middle of the night by strangers, without knowing where they are being taken or
why, can suffer "everlasting trauma that includes emotional distress and trust
issues with the parent(s)." 2 12 Although simply restraining a child may not always
constitute child abuse, using violent force to subdue a child while inflicting
unjustifiable physical and emotional pain would fall within the purview of child
abuse.2 13
The use of restraints in the youth-transportation industry is particularly disconcerting. When children are transported, they are usually handcuffed or otherwise
restrained,2 14 even though transport companies claim to handcuff children only if
they become violent or resistant. 215 Restraints have already been a controversial
subject within the public- and private-school context because of the injuries and
deaths that have resulted from their use.2 16 These same risks of unjustifiable
physical pain are also present when restraints are used on children in the youthtransportation context. For example, children who resist the transporters are often
physically restrained through the use of violent force.2 17 When one teenager,
Aaron Reed, broke away from his transporters and headed toward a window to
escape, the transporters knee-dropped him in the middle of his back, bent his
wrist back, leaned over and said, "Ifyou don't stop f-- - -ing screaming, I'm going
to bust your f- - - -ing wrist." 2 1 8 Transporters have even admitted to using

211. Labi, supra note 2, at 28, 30.
212. Swint, supra note 7.
213. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119c (2006 & Supp. 2011).
214. See Swint, supra note 7.
215. E.g., Youth Transport-Questionsand Answers, supra note 9 ("We will not utilize any restraints unless
the Teen is in imminent danger of injuring themselves or others.").
216. See U.S. Gov'T AccouNTAluTrrY Optici;, supra note 118, at 10-13 tbl.1 (summarizing cases where
children were killed or seriously injured while being restrained at school).
217. Holding, supra note 12.
218. Id.
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chokeholds to render children unconscious. 2 19 Thus, employing restraints on
children being transported clearly can inflict unjustifiable physical pain on the
child.
In addition to the physical risks involved, the use of restraints can also cause
children serious psychological and emotional harm. 2 2 0 In the youth-transportation
context, most of the children being transported have not been charged with or
convicted of any crime. Handcuffing these children, especially in public, is
inhumane and degrading. 22 ' Vermont has addressed these harms in the juvenileoffender context by requiring the least restrictive means of transport.2 22 Furthermore, the use of restraints arguably is also anti-therapeutic, despite the purported
intent of the parents and the transportation companies to reform the child.
In the private-transportation context, the use of mechanical and physical
restraints is prevalent. Given the trauma that accompanies many of these interventions, youths who are transported against their will by strangers not surprisingly
may become violent and aggressive. In addition, because private-transport companies service behavioral institutions, youths being transported are more likely to be
troubled and, as a result, potentially violent. Although many of the transportation
company web sites claim to use restraints only as a last resort, reports indicate
otherwise.2 23 Because of the increased likelihood of violence, transporters frequently will be required to conduct certain interventions with the use of restraints.
Applying the reasoning in Wyatt ex rel. Rawlins v. King2 2 4 in the context of
treatment of the mentally ill, staff working with such youths should be required to
have specific training regarding interventions that are germane to their unique care
during transport.2 2 5 Some state laws draw an important distinction by allowing
restraints of children in emergency situations and prohibiting restraints for convenience or coercion. While the companies initially claim to use restraints only if the
child becomes resistant or combative, many children are cuffed preventatively, 226
suggesting a combination of coercion and convenience.
Handcuffing is inherently coercive by making the child feel less in control, thus
more easily permitting the transporter to dominate him or her. Moreover, handcuffs become tools of convenience when used simply to assure the transporter that
the child is less capable of resisting or escaping, even when the child has not yet
demonstrated an inclination to resist or escape. In sum, there is an extremely high

219. Labi, supra note 2, at 29.
220. BANKS ET AL., supra note 120, at 3.

221. Id.
222. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
223. See Swint, supra note 7 (discussing the frequent use of restraints).
224. 793 F. Supp. 1058 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (concerning the treatment of patients involuntarily committed to the
custody and care of the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation).
225. See id. at 1063, 1067, 1069 (recognizing the need for better training appropriate to the context to protect
patients' rights).
226. See Labi, supra note 2, at 30.
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potential of significant abuse in these contexts: the private-transportation companies are not subject to public scrutiny and have obtained indemnification from
parents for most, if not all, of the consequences of their conduct. Thus, there is a
dire need for regulation regarding the use of mechanical and physical restraints,
transporter training, and transporter background checks.2 27
C. The CircumstancesSurrounding Youth Transport Often Constitute
Kidnapping and False Imprisonment
In addition to child abuse, kidnapping and false imprisonment are also of critical
concern in the youth-transportation industry. The transport process in the youthtransportation industry is strikingly similar to kidnapping: a stranger enters the
youth's bedroom in the middle of the night and makes it clear that the child has no
choice but to leave with the transporter. Eventually the child receives confirmation
that his parents sanctioned the abduction, sometimes through a letter read once the
child is securely confined to the strangers' vehicle, or sometimes just by the sight
of his parents waving goodbye on the front porch as the child is driven away.
Any bystander witnessing such an abduction would not hesitate to phone the
police and report a child kidnapping, unless they realize that the parents consented
to-and paid for-the transport. Because the parents are involved, however, it
seems more like a "consensual kidnapping." As discussed above,2 2 8 kidnapping
laws vary from state to state and include caveats for consent and parents' authority
over minor children. Courts have also circumscribed parents' ability to confine
their children by introducing considerations of reasonableness and other unlawful
behavior.22 9 But the degree to which parents can reasonably delegate their
authority and their potential liability for incidental abuses that may occur simultaneously is unclear.
Under the federal kidnapping statute, such a removal should be considered
kidnapping because all of the statute's elements 230 appear to be satisfied. The
interstate commerce element of the statute is met whenever the child is transported
across state lines.2 3' The transport process also satisfies the federal kidnapping
statute's element of carrying away or abducting, as well as the purpose element,
"for ransom or reward or otherwise."232

227. But see Reynolds Holding, Child-Escort Services Must Be Restrained, S.F. CHRON., June 13, 1999, at 3
(reporting that an organization with ties to West Shield Investigations, lobbying against the California regulation
of child-escort services, argued that reasonable means of forcing children to accompany the escorts, including the
use of handcuffs, should be allowed).
228. See supra Part I.C.2.
229. See supra notes 109-17 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
231. See 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012); United States v. Welch, 10 F.3d 573, 574 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)
(holding that transportation across state lines is not an essential element of the kidnapping offense, but merely
serves to provide federal jurisdiction and therefore need not be performed willfully and knowingly).
232. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (emphasis added).
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Although the federal statute provides an exemption for parents,233 this exemption may not apply when a parent hires a third party to remove the child. The
transport process raises questions about the type of conduct to which parents can
consent on behalf of their children and thus the kind of legal authority third-party
transport services possess.2 34 Even assuming that transport companies qualify as
parents under the doctrine of in loco parentis, these companies could still be liable
for kidnapping if their conduct and actions exceed those of a reasonable parent.235
The reasonableness standard alone, however, does not provide an easily applicable
way to determine whether particular transporter conduct is acceptable.
Regardless of parental consent, a transport likely constitutes kidnapping if the
minor has a recognizable will. 2 3 6 Because behavior-modification facilities typically accept juveniles up to approximately eighteen years of age,2 37 many of those
who are transported are older than the age at which many courts have found
children to have a recognizable will in other contexts. 2 3 8 But this reasoning has not
been extended to the youth-transportation context, in which youths are often
denied the legal right to object to their own kidnapping. 239 Accordingly, parents'
consent to the abduction of their children should not alone be sufficient to absolve
transport companies of federal kidnapping liability. State kidnapping laws, on the
other hand, are typically written more narrowly, thereby giving transport companies greater opportunity to avoid liability. While the federal statute requires only
that the kidnapping be "for ransom or reward or otherwise,"240 state laws often
require that the kidnapping be carried out for a specific enumerated purpose, such
233. Id. § 1201(g}-(h).
234. See supra Part II.A (discussing the different kinds of authority parents may delegate to youth
transporters).
235. See United States v. Brown, 330 F.3d 1073, 1079 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that the defendant did not
qualify as a surrogate parent because his sexually abusive behavior was not that of a surrogate parent). But see
United States v. Floyd, 81 F.3d 1517, 1523-24 (10th Cir. 1996) (establishing that a non-biological parent qualifies
for the parental exception to the kidnapping statute if that person "fulfill[s] the responsibilities of a parent at the
time of the kidnapping," which include "love, affection, support, maintenance, instruction, discipline, and
guidance").
236. See Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455, 460 (1946).
237. See, e.g., The Boston Center ARBOUR HEALTH SYsTEM, http://www.arbourhealth.com/organizations/theboston-center/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014) ("Services include highly structured, intensive behavior modification
group programs for children, ages 6-12, and adolescents, ages 13-18, with acute emotional and behavioral
difficulties."); C. Kapela, Mitt Romney: A Voice of Freedom and Hope? Notfor America's So-Called "Troubled"
Youth, WWASP DIARIES (Apr. 14, 2012), http://wwaspdiaries.com/2012/04/14/nitt-romney-a-voice-of-freedomand-hope-not-for-americas-so-called-troubled-youth/ (describing a facility in Oregon at which children "rang[ed]
in age from 13 to 17.5"); STRATEGIC BEHAVIORAL CENTER, http://www.sbcwilmington.coml (last visited Mar. 21,
2014) (providing services to "male and female adolescents ages 12-17").
238. See United States v. McCabe, 812 F.2d 1060, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a twenty-three-monthold child did not have a recognizable will, because a child has a recognizable will when he understands the
concept of kidnapping and its potential relevance to his situation); supra note 154 and accompanying text (stating
that lack of recognizable will is the federal standard for when the child's consent does not control).
239. Cf W. Shield Investigations & Sec. Consultants v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 612, 627 (Ct. App.
2000) (involving a girl who was sixteen years old at the time of her abduction).
240. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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as to commit a felony.2 4 1 It is difficult to pinpoint whether a felonious act actually
occurs during the course of a transport, however. For example, although transporters represent that they do not handcuff or otherwise restrain transportees unnecessarily-which could constitute felonious child abuse-some transporters admit
that they do handcuff children every time.242
The personal stories found online and in interviews demonstrate that a transport
can quickly escalate to the point where transporters use excessive force.243
Because state kidnapping statutes often include a felonious-purpose element, and
child abuse is a felonious act, transporters who employ unreasonable excessive
force during the transport could be liable not only for child abuse, but also for
kidnapping. 2 " But just as under federal law, the reasonableness standard does not
provide an easily applicable means of determining what transporter behavior will
be deemed lawful. 24 5
Even if kidnapping is not implicated, transporters may still be guilty of false
imprisonment. This might be the result if, for example, all of the elements except
the purpose element of kidnapping are met.24 6 Like kidnapping, however, falseimprisonment claims are also difficult to establish in the transport context because
they depend on whether parents can consent to the transport on their children's
behalf. Whether parents can provide consent depends on how much authority
parents can delegate to third-party transport companies and if the youth has a
recognizable will.
If parents can in fact delegate full authority over their child to a transporter, the
inquiry becomes whether the transport was conducted reasonably, because even
parents can be liable for false imprisonment when they confine their children
unreasonably. 247 As under the kidnapping analysis, however, reasonableness is

241. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1304 (2010); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §2905.01 (LexisNexis Supp.
2013); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901 (Supp. 2012); MOD. PENAL CODE §212.1 (1985).
242. Swint, supra note 7.
243. See Holding, supra note 12 (setting forth cases of violence).
244. Many state child abuse statutes are applicable only to parties responsible for the child's welfare. CHILD
wELFARE INFO. GAEwAY, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., WHAT IS CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT?
RECOGNIZING SIGNS AND SymIIoms 2 (2013), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/what
iscan.pdf; see CHILD WELFARE INFo. GAEWAY, U.S. DEP'T oF HEAI.TH & HUMAN SERvs., DEFINITIONS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 7-92 (2011), available at http://www. childwelfare.gov/systemwidelaws-policies/statutes/
define.pdf (summarizing each state's child abuse statute). Because transporters are acting in loco parentis, they
satisfy this requirement.
245. See Holding, supra note 40 (arguing that what is reasonable behavior in the child-care context is not
analogous to the youth-transportation industry).
246. See supra notes 158-61 and accompanying text (establishing that false imprisonment is a lesser included
offense of kidnapping and is differentiated by its lack of a purpose requirement).
247. See State v. Kinchen, 963 P.2d 928, 929 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998) (acknowledging that parents may be guilty
of false imprisonment of their own children in circumstances in which the restrictions on the children's
movements, viewed objectively, are excessive, immoderate, or unreasonable); State v. Teynor, 414 N.W.2d 76, 80
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (noting that it is possible for parents to commit false imprisonment against their own
children and that exercising their authority unreasonably is one such way to do so).
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difficult to determine. This flimsy test thus provides children with insufficient
protection, especially because courts have refused to clearly delineate the line
between reasonable and unreasonable behavior 2 4 8 and tend to construe parental
authority broadly.2 4 9 To better protect children, regulations should be implemented, including the requirement that parents obtain the consent of a neutral
fact-finder before hiring a transport company to convey their children to a
treatment facility.
Alternatively, if regulations requiring a neutral fact-finder are not promulgated, courts should at least engage in an individualized determination of whether
the youth being transported has a recognizable will. Youths who have a recognizable will should be able to object to their parents' decision to send them to a
behavior-modification facility. Without conducting this recognizable-will inquiry,
parental consent to a minor's confinement and transport unjustly relieves transport
companies of false-imprisonment liability. 25 0 Courts' reluctance to recognize a
minor's will in the youth-transport context, combined with the heightened potential for abuse in these circumstances, produce the need for regulations similar to
those implemented in analogous situations to protect transported children.
D. ComparableAbuses in the Transportof Juvenile Offenders and
PrivatePrisonersDemonstrate the Need for Regulation
Two comparable industries illustrate an effective approach for regulating the
youth-transportation industry: the juvenile-offender and the private-prisoner transportation industries. Regulation of the juvenile-offender transportation industry
arose largely in response to rampant child abuse. Before the establishment of a
separate juvenile-court system, many children were sent away to reform institutions without ever having committed a crime 2 5 '-mifforing the current situation
in the youth-transportation industry. These reformatory "houses of refuge" were
unregulated, resulting in numerous abuses to the children living there.2 52
With the establishment of a separate, regulated juvenile-justice system after
Kent, juveniles were able to rely on the state to ensure their safety and welfare.25 3
The Court in Kent, Gault, and Parham recognized the due process rights of
juveniles, 2 54 and the state now regulates every aspect of the juvenile justice
system, including the transportation of offenders. 2 55 The liberty interests described

248. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
250. Cf Kellar v. Wills, 186 F. App'x 714, 715-16 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (holding that a student could
not maintain a false-imprisonment claim against her therapeutic school because her parents consented to her
enrollment with full knowledge of the school's programs and restrictions).
251. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
252. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
254. See supra Part I.B.
255. See supra Part I.B.
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in the cases above also apply to the children presently being transported to
reformatory institutions by private-transport companies. Therefore, the same path
to regulation must be taken to ensure their safety and welfare.
State policies for transporting juvenile offenders can provide a model for the
currently unregulated private youth-transportation industry. If the state has an
interest in juvenile offenders' health and safety, 25 6 it surely also has an interest in
the health and safety of innocent children who are transported privately. The state
should therefore extend the regulations applicable to the transport of juvenile
offenders to the private transport of children to reformatory institutions. Vermont's
policy for transporting children in state custody serves as a progressive model.25 7
Private transporters should not use restraints unless absolutely necessary to protect
the child or others from harm, and each time restraints are used transporters
should log a written report outlining why the restraints were justified. Vermont also
requires that the youths be accompanied by an adult with whom they are
familiar. 2 58 This person does not need to be a parent, but can be someone whom the
child knows and trusts, to ease the trauma of travelling with strangers and ensure
the welfare of the child. 25 9 This regulation for transporting juvenile offenders
serves as an example of rules that ensure the health, safety, and welfare of children
in any sort of transport.
In addition, the genesis and evolution of private youth-transportation companies
mirror those of private-prisoner transport companies. Just as the need for privateprisoner companies arose from the growing private-prison industry, youthtransportation services also emerged as private behavior-modification programs
gained popularity. These private youth-transport companies, however, are unregulated and are thus susceptible to the same mistreatment and abuse that permeated
the private-prisoner transport industry prior to its regulation.26 0
The circumstances that facilitate such abuses are similar in both contexts. For
example, just as two men were permitted to transport one female prisoner prior to
regulation of the private-prison industry, men are currently permitted to transport
female youths in the youth-transportation industry, thus creating circumstances
conducive to sexual abuse. 2 6 1 Further, the lack of regulations regarding employee
background checks and hiring in the private-prisoner transport industry led to
assault and sexual abuse. Similarly, the lack of regulation in the private youth-

256. See supra Part lB.
257. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
258. VT. AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVS., DEP'T FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, TRANSPORTATION OF- CHILDREN IN STATE

CUSTODY 3 (2011), available at http://dcf.vermont.gov/sites/dcf/files/pdf/reports/TransportingYouth.pdf.
259. Id.
260. See Friedmann, supra note 191 (recounting the story of an abused female prisoner); see also Holding,
supra note 12 (describing Autumn Joyce-taken from her bed at five a.m. by a towering man and thrown to the
floor).
261. See Friedmann, supra note 191 (describing how a female prisoner was transported by two men); see also
Holding, supra note 12 (reporting that female children are at times transported solely by male transporters).

KIDNAPPING INCORPORATED

2014]

597

transport industry has allowed transport companies to hire "agents who not only
have criminal histories[] (including sexual abuse)[,] but have also been arrested
while transporting teens and charged with unlawful imprisonment and assault." 2 6 2
Just as these abuses were the catalyst for the development of juvenile-offender and
private-prisoner transport regulations, the misconduct in the youth-transportation
context demonstrates the critical need for industry regulation.
III. PROPOSED REGULATION

Based on the regulations implemented for the transportation of juvenile offenders and private prisoners, the following is a proposed federal regulation to protect
children who are transported by private companies.
A. Purpose. The purpose of this regulation is to protect the well-being of
minors who are transported by private youth-transportation companies to
private residential facilities by providing minimum security and safety standards for such transport.
B. Definitions. For purposes of this section:
1. A "youth transportation service" means an entity, other than the United
States, a State, or any inferior political subdivision of a State, that engages in

the business of transporting minors for compensation, based on the authority
delegated from the minor's parent(s) or legal guardian(s), for the purpose of
transporting to a behavioral-modification facility, private mental hospitals, and
like private institutions, or an attempt thereof.
2. A "behavioral modification facility" is a residential treatment facility that
enrolls minors who are perceived as displaying problematic behavior in an
attempt to alter their conduct.
3. A "restraint" is a tool used to limit the mobility of an individual through the
use of force, which can be physical, mechanical, or chemical. Such restraints

may include, but are not exclusively, handcuffs, shackles, stun guns, zip ties,
and pepper sprays.
4. A "minor" means any person under the age of eighteen years. 263
C. Neutral Fact-finder.
1. A child may be transported by a youth-transportation service to a behavioralmodification facility only after a proceeding conducted by a neutral and
detached fact-finder.
2. The fact-finder who conducts the inquiry may not profit, financially or
otherwise, from the physical placement of the child in that setting.

262. Swint, supra note 7.
263. The definition of minor varies by state.
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3. Upon determination by the fact-finder that the following circumstances
clearly exist, the fact-finder may approve a parent's or legal guardian's
decision to send the child to a behavioral-modification facility:
a. the child demonstrates a risk of harm to himself/herself or others;
b. the child is experiencing significant impairment in his/her ability to
perform socially;
c. the child will benefit from care and treatment by the behavioralmodification facility; and
d. there is no appropriate less-restrictive alternative.
4. The commitment proceeding before the neutral and detached fact-finder
shall be conducted in as informal a manner as possible, and in a physical
setting that is not likely to have a harmful effect on the child.
D. Standards and Requirements.
1. Pre-employment screening. Pre-employment screening measures must include determination of a valid driver's license, a background check, and a test
for the use of controlled substances. The background check must include a
fingerprint-based criminal background check. A person will be disqualified
from employment if he/she has either (1) a prior felony conviction, or (2) a
misdemeanor conviction for a domestic-violence crime, sex crime, or a crime
involving child abuse. The failure of an employee to pass any screening
measure shall act as a bar to employment.
2. Employee training.Youth-transportation services must require the completion of 100 hours of employee training before an employee may transport a
minor. Training must include instruction in each of the following areas:
a. use of restraints;
b. use of force;
c. first aid;
d. cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR);
e. non-violent crisis intervention;
f. anger management; and
g. suicide awareness and prevention.
3. Maximum driving time. Youth-transportation services must adhere to the
maximum driving time provisions applicable to commercial motor vehicle
operators, as set forth in Department of Transportation regulations at 49 C.F.R.
395.3, which will apply regardless of whether the youth-transportation service
is covered by Department of Transportation regulations.
4. Transporter-to-transporteeratio. Youth-transportation services must ensure that at least two transporters be present for every minor being transported.
This requirement does not preclude a contracting entity from establishing more
stringent transporter-to-transportee ratios. Youth-transportation services must
also ensure that, when transporting female individuals, at least one female
transporter or female accompanying adult must be present.
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5. Use of restraints.Youth-transportation-service employees shall not possess
or employ the use of chemical restraints. Physical and mechanical restraints
may be employed to the extent reasonable and necessary under the circumstances to prevent immediate harm to the transportee, the transporter, or third
parties. Under no circumstance should the duration of the restraint exceed the
period of imminent harm. Before commencing the transport, transporters
should obtain the explicit permission or lack thereof from a parent or guardian
to employ the use of restraints on the transportee. In the event that a transporter
employs the use of a physical or mechanical restraint, such transporter must
promptly write and file a detailed report describing the reason for such use, the
restraints applied, the duration of the restraint, along with all other relevant
information.
6. Standards to ensure the safety of minors during transport.Youth transport
services must ensure that:
a. protective measures are in place to make sure that all vehicles are safe
and well-maintained, including documentation of completed repairs and
regular maintenance;
b. vehicles are equipped with efficient communication systems;
c. policies, practices, and procedures are in effect to ensure the health
and physical safety of the minors during transport, including a fire
extinguisher, functioning seat belts, a first-aid kit, and employees who
are qualified to dispense medications and administer CPR and emergency first aid;
d. policies, practices, and procedures are in effect to prohibit possession
or use of firearms, mistreatment of minors, use of excessive force, and
sexual misconduct; and
e. the well-being of minors in their custody is maintained. This includes,
but is not limited to, necessary stops for restroom use and meals, proper
heating and ventilation of the transport vehicle, climate-appropriate
clothing, and prohibitions on the use of tobacco or alcohol in any form in
the transport vehicle.
E. Insurance.
All individual transporters must have personal vehicle insurance. In addition,
each youth-transportation service must have liability insurance related to the
transport of youths.
F. Enforcement.
Any person found in violation of the regulations in this Part will:
1. be liable to the United States for a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed
for each violation; and
$
2. be liable to the United States for the costs of collection.
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If, as a result of a violation, any minor is seriously injured, those liable for the
violation shall be required to compensate the victim.
CONCLUSION

The youth-transportation industry implicates legal concerns ranging from
the delegation of parental authority to child abuse, kidnapping, and false imprisonment. The industry is permitted to exist, essentially without regulation, and is
purportedly legal. The circumstances surrounding industry practices, however,
facilitate unreasonable and unlawful conduct. In the course of developing American law, states and courts have maintained a laissez-faire approach to the rights
of parents in disciplining their children. But these rights should not be accorded
as much deference as they have been in the youth-transport context because of the
great potential for serious harm to children during transport. Instead, when this
type of liberty interest is at stake, the government should require a neutral
fact-finder to determine whether the desired parental action actually serves the
child's best interest.
While we might like to assume that parents always act with the best interests
of their children in mind, 264 and that a neutral fact-finder would in fact be bound
to do so, neither assumption is sufficient to protect children's rights. Without any
regulation of the transportation services themselves, no parent or court-appointed
fact-finder should, in good conscience, permit a child to be taken to a behaviormodification facility by these companies. If we are actually committed to protecting the rights and ensuring the physical and emotional well-being of minors,
transport companies should be federally regulated.
Many people are shocked to learn about the youth-transportation industry and
the unrestricted way in which it operates. It undeniably parallels other private
and state-run programs that once were responsible for committing serious physical
and emotional abuse. It is imperative, therefore, that society become more aware
of these services and that the government adequately regulate them to protect our
children.

264. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.

